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"The art of taxation consists in so plucking the 
goose to obtain the largest amount of feathers,  
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Tax and tax policy are at the heart of the State, reflecting decisions on how public and private 
sectors should work together. Tax policy has developed far beyond its traditional focus on revenue 
raised (and its stability and predictability), to encompass assessment of the effects of taxation on 
efficiency, fairness, incentives, and competitiveness, as well as taking account of compliance and 
administration costs. The challenges for tax policy increasingly relate to ensuring coherence across  
the  tax  system,  to  using  tax  in  support  of  the  Government’s  wider  social,  economic  and 
environmental objectives, and ensuring policy is based upon firm evidence and best use is made of 
information.  
 
One of the issue in policy analysis which has attracted much attention and analysis in 
recent years is the expanding divergence of the so called book-tax gap,  LH the difference 
between book and taxable income (Desai, 2003 and 2004; Mills and Plesko, 2003). Some of 
the reasons why remunerative firms may not report tax liabilities include the difference between tax 
and balance sheets depreciation of assets, current-year operating losses, losses carried forward 
from preceding tax years, sufficient tax credits/reliefs available to offset income tax liabilities, HWF. 
In fact, due to the dynamic nature of the budgeting activity and to overlapping (and sometimes 
differently  targeted)  fiscal  policies,  some  corporation  could  report  positive  book  profits,  while 
paying nothing in corporate income taxes and some other could show negative book-tax gaps. Due 
to  the  several  degrees  of  freedom  available,  we  may  say  that  tax  liabilities  are 
endogenous from managers’ point of view in that they are nothing else than a cost to 
be minimised. In the international literature the real concern with the gap is not that 
it  is  exist,  but  that  the  difference  may  be  caused  by  some  misleading  or  even 
fraudulent activity on the part of firms in reporting book income, taxable income, or 
both.  The  recent  and  dramatic  cases  of  Enron,  WorldCom,  American  International 
Group etc. suggest that even extreme events are a real problem. Also, while there is 
little debate that the incomes are diverging, the cause of the divergence and whether 
and how to fix it are very much open questions even in the political circles. In 2004 US 
policymakers  released  a  draft  of  the  final  version  of  the  Schedule  M-3  Net  Income  (Loss) 
Reconciliation  for  Corporations,  targeted  to  make  differences  between financial  accounting  net 
income and taxable income more transparent.  
 
While similar worries are emerging in Italy as well (see below), to the best of my knowledge 
very few works on the book-tax gap for Italian enterprises exist. The main reason for that is the 
lack of reliable data - in Italy there is unsatisfactory evidence even on the basic quantification of the 
gap.  Against  this  framework,  the  Diecofis  database  (Oropallo,  2004)  eventually  allows 
searching  for  some  empirical  indication  on  those  subjects.  In  particular,  the  goal  and  the 
contribution of this paper is to highlight some stylised facts lying behind the difference between 
post-tax book and taxable income of Italian corporations. The Diecofis dataset covers one year only 
and it may be useful just for preliminary indications. Therefore the present attempt must be seen as 
the initial step of deeper and wider analyses. On the positive side the Diecofis database is i) very 
analytical (item-by-item); ii) fully representative of the universe (nearly 500,000 coroprations); iii) 
under  continuous  updating.  Thus,  hopefully,  useful  insights  can  emerge  in  this  first  static 
measurement exercise about the “income race” as well. 
 
As the results of this paper show, the industry set up to enable Italian taxpayers to identify and take 
advantage of particular tax effects, is very active. This is an expected outcome, why pay more? So, 
firms appear to engage in a variety of behaviours that perhaps, absent tax considerations, would be 
simply undone. An uncontrolled proliferation of these activities imply an increase of costs for firms 
and may constitute a serious issue threatening the tax system. A signal of that could be the very   3 
high share of not-tax-deductible items on taxable income (80%). That is to say, firms use all their 
discretional legal power to reduce their tax liabilities. On the other hand, there are striking shares of 
companies with opposite book-tax positions. More than half (57%) of the corporations reports both 
negative post-tax book profits and positive taxable incomes; 16% of the firms starting with positive 
post-tax book profits ends up with zero/negative taxable incomes. Another clue suggestive of the 
potential problems linked to the presence of the income gap can be detected by the increasing 
“curiosity” of Italian fiscal authorities about corporations’ balance sheets
2. Side-by-side with the so-
called sectoral studies (studi di settore), explicitly aimed to disclose “data incoherence”, the section 
“further balance sheets elements” of the tax form report (Modello Unico) is continuously calling for 
more and more details. On that, it is interesting to notice that fiscal authorities ask corporations to 
declare revenues and costs not/under reported in the financial accounting. Data show that the former 
amounts  to  474,000 euros,  the  latter  to  22  billions  of  euro.  Needless  to  say,  this  result  is  not 
necessarily associated with misleading/fraudulent activities on the part of companies, but 
some suspicion remains (see section 5) and it could explain part of the above mentioned curiosity of 
the lawmakers.    
 
A disaggregated analysis at the sectoral, geographical, and dimensional level shows that the tax 
arbitrage across budget items facing different tax treatment generates very different book-tax gaps. 
As mentioned, 16% of the Italian corporations starting with positive post-tax book profits ends up 
with zero/negative taxable incomes. Well, this latter share is much more lower among southern 
corporations and large enterprises, especially in the construction and in the hotel/restaurant services 
sectors. Then, it is worth noticing that data show a high (53%) and significant correlation between 
sectoral irregularity ratio (irregular full time equivalent units on sectoral total) and the share of 
firms reporting non positive taxable incomes. This outcome is somewhat in line with the worries of 
the Advisers of the Revenue Departments (SECIT). SECIT (2001) argues that (pag. 15, translation 
of the author) “it is worth noting that the tax evasion must play a significant role if even in 1998 
more than 40% of the Italian corporations report losses.” 
 
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section I deal with the data set, section 3 explains 
why the incomes can be different. The following two sections report some quantitative evidence on 
how much they are different both at the aggregate (section 4) and at the disaggregate level (section 





                                                 





The database used in the present analysis is the result of the integration of different sources carried 
out in the Diecofis project. The resulting information system is called Enterprise Integrated and 
Systematized Information System (EISIS). The first step in integrating all sources is the selection of 
the “spine” information that will be used as a basis for the integration process. The “spine” is 
constituted by the statistical register of Italian active enterprises (ASIA)
4. Other sources are both 
statistical and administrative. Statistical surveys from ISTAT are: 
 
-  Structural Business Statistics 
-  Survey  of  Accounts  System  with  100  or  more  workers  (6&,); 
-    Small and Medium Enterprise Survey with less than 100 workers (30,);  
-  Industrial Production Survey (3URGFRP);  
-  Foreign trade survey (&2() 
-  Other surveys such as the Community Innovation Survey (&,6) and the ,&7 Survey.  
 
The information coming from the administrative sources that have been integrated in the  (,6,6 
database include:  
 
Company Accounts (&$) data from the Chamber of Commerce annual report that complement 
ISTAT business survey of account system (6&, and 30,) for all corporate and some co-operatives 
and consortium enterprises only;  
Fiscal data (),6&$/) from the Revenue Agency annual tax returns. 
 
The main effort which was necessary to undertake was the development of a methodology to allow 
data  linkage  between  the  information  of  the  above  surveys  and  the  whole  enterprise  universe, 
represented  by  the  data  register  of  enterprises.  In  the  ASIA  archive,  ISTAT  files  all  active 
enterprises except those belonging to Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing (A, B sectors according to 
NACE classification), to the Public Sector (L) and other services (O91, P and Q). This can be used 
as a starting point or common basis for the linkage of all survey data. In the ASIA archive the 
following information is included: 
 
Identification variables (Asia Key, legal code and VAT code); 
Localization variables (Postal, municipality and province code); 
Classification variables (Ateco, and legal type); 
Size variables (Employers, employees and the net turnover); 
Demographic variables (births and deaths); 
Groups variables (code of the group of enterprises). 
 
Looking at the quality of the available information, enterprise size seems to be a “key” variable. In 
fact, exhaustive information (which covers the whole universe) is available for large enterprises that 
have at least 100 workers, while for small and medium ones only sample data is available. A second 
characteristic that appears to be very important is the legal form, as the type of tax that an enterprise 
is required to pay depends on it. Another problem is to identify the business unit. This means 
basically choosing a variable which can be a unique key and act as a natural bridge between the 
different sources. In almost all firms’ databases the ID code is represented by the VAT code or the 
fiscal code.  
                                                 
3 I thank F. Oropallo to let me reproduce part of his paper (Oropallo, 2005). 
4 The ASIA project started in 1995, its goal is to improve and update the register of all Italian enterprises. It is the result of the 
integration of external sources with ISTAT Archives (old Sirio-nai archive, 7° Industry Census and survey SK). External sources are: 
VAT Register of the Ministry of Finances; Chambers of Commerce; INAIL (National Institute of Insurance Against Accidents at 
Work); INPS (National Social Security Institute); ENEL (Electricity Public Company); Yellow Pages.   5 
 
The population is shown in the table below. It excludes the financial service sector because the 






%XVLQHVVVHFWRU/HJDOW\SH 8QLQFRUSRUDWHG &RUSRUDWLRQV 7RWDO
Products from mining   2,069   2,067   4,136  
Manufacturing   447,324   121,498   568,822  
Electrical energy gas steam and water   432   1,761   2,193  
Construction   445,667   75,482   521,149  
       
Wholesale and retail trade services   1,210,299   134,175   1,344,474  
Hotel and restaurant services   232,666    22,473   255,139  
Transport storage and communication services   143,009   24,222   167,231  
Real estate renting and business services   684,013   138,119   822,132  
Other Services  424,950   35,824   460,774  
       
7RWDO   
3HUFHQWDJHRIILUPV   
3HUFHQWDJHRIWRWDOHPSOR\PHQW   
3HUFHQWDJHRIWXUQRYHU   
 
 
The total corporate enterprises represent the population of reference of the corporate tax module. 
They are the 13 percent of the total, but they employ more than the 50 percent of the workers and 
produce the 76 percent of the total turnover. 

The final dataset is the result of integration steps here not reported for saving space. The interested 








Management calculates corporate income for  two external purposes each  year. The 
first is for financial reporting purposes under generally accepted accounting principles 
and  the  second  is  done  in  accordance  with  the  fiscal  code  to  determine  the 
corporation’s tax liabilities. Financial accounting income is intended to provide outside 
stakeholders  (investors,  creditors,  regulators,  etc.)  with  information  about  firm 
performance.  In  contrast,  the  objectives  of  the  “tax-side”  income  are  to  provide  a 
framework  for  efficient  and  equitable  determination  of  tax  liabilities  and  the 
subsequent collection of revenue, and to provide incentives for firms to engage in, or 
not engage in, particular activities, and to reward particular constituencies. 
 
In Italy corporate income relevant for fiscal purposes is obtained from total business 
profits (loss) resulting from the company balance sheet adjusted according to specific 
fiscal rules. In particular, components of the business profits have to be modified in 
order to take account of fiscal criteria, which may affect positively or negatively the 
corresponding  accounting  variables.  These  fiscal  adjustments  reflect  the  difference 
existing  between  conventional  accounting  rules  and  business  accounting  for  tax 
purposes.  The  usual  example  that  can  be  made  to  clarify  this  point  regards,  for 
instance, the definition of depreciation of both tangible and intangible assets provided 
by the tax law which differs from economic depreciation reported in the balance sheet. 
As for the fiscal year
5 2000 (the only year for which I have data), the procedure going 
form the profit to the corporate tax due was the following:  
 
 
Table 2. A sketched tax return for Italian Corporations (Modello Unico 2001) 
,7(0'(6&5,37,21 Fiscal Code
3RVWWD[LQFRPHORVVUHVXOWLQJIURPWKHEDODQFHVKHHW  5)5)
  +positive adjustment (not tax deductible items, HWF)  5)
  - negative adjustment (tax-exempt items, non-reported costs, HWF)    5)
= FRUSRUDWHLQFRPHIRUWD[SXUSRVHV  5) 51
  +dividend tax credit  51
  - losses from previous periods brought forward  51
= WD[DEOHLQFRPH  51
Income subject to the ordinary rate (37%)  51
Income subject to the preferential rate (19%, Dual Income Tax system)  51
= JURVVFRUSRUDWHWD[  51
  - tax reliefs (donations to political parties, HWF)   51
= QHWFRUSRUDWHWD[  51
  - tax credits (dividend tax credit, HWF)  51




To the present end, the above sketched tax form report (Modello Unico 2001) needs some further 
explanation. Firstly, the reported fiscal codes correspond to specific rows of the tax return and give 
an idea of the omitted sub-items. For instance, the missing rows between post-tax profit (RF3) and 
                                                 
5 Accordingly, I focus on the relative tax return (Unico 2001).    7 
total  positive  adjustments  (RF32)  imply  that  there  are  twenty-seven
6  sort  of  positive 
adjustments (see the next section). Then, it must be noted that RF3 is the book profit 
net of (income and regional) taxes. Therefore the present paper is different from the 
extant literature because it focuses i) on Italian situation and ii) on the post-tax book 
income. In fact, here I focus on the differences between three incomes, namely RF3, 
RN1,  and  RN6.  Needless  to  say,  tax  sheltering  manoeuvres,  window  dressing  activities  HWF, 
impinge also on these tax incomes by modifying RF3
7. Finally, since I deal with income gaps I 
will focus only up to the row corresponding to RN6. Given the ongoing nature of the present paper 
other possible and interesting analyses are relegated in the agenda.  
  
 
                                                 
6 The row RF4 shows the loss resulting from the balance sheet, thus it does not belong to the adjustments (Table 2).     
7 It is well-known that even pre-tax corporate income can be manipulated for tax planning. Just to mention, large firms 




The previous section should have cleared why the three incomes under scrutiny could drift apart. In 
this section I exploit the Diecofis database in search of some evidence. Since I have just one single 
year for aggregate data I may only offer some descriptive statistics. To this end, it seems productive 
to start quantifying the most important items as they emerge from the database.    
 
 
Table 3. Book-Tax Corporate Incomes (¼, fiscal year 2000) 
Item Description (Fiscal Code)  Total  Per Capita* 
     
Post-tax income resulting from the balance sheet (RF3)           44,893,081,302          128,160  
Positive adjustment (RF32)          72,974,090,804       147,160  
Negative adjustment (RF47)           49,886,496,574        100,602  
Corporate income for tax purposes (RN1)           68,962,868,812        158,997  
Taxable income (RN6)  66,453,807,118        175,555  
Net corporate tax (RN13)      22,776,041,674  60,169 
* The whole sample is made up by 495,882 firms. Since not all of them report, HJ, post-tax profit or taxable income, 
per capita value are computed accordingly (HJpositive post-tax profit are reported by 350,288 corporations). For other 
details see Table 2. 
 
Had all companies paid the full 37 percent corporate (top) tax rate on their 66.5 ¼ billion in taxable 
income (RN6), their income taxes would have totalled 24.6 ¼ billion. This latter amount could be by 
and large compared with 22.7 ¼ billion, the net corporate tax (RN13). 
 
Per capita values show that RN6 is the largest income. This somewhat puzzling outcome is due to 
the  presence  of  83,449  firms  with  positive  taxable  income  and  negative  RF3.  The  following 
Cartesian graph reports the data for all the four possible book-tax situations.  
 
 













When RF3>0, RN6=0 are added to RN6<0. 
When RF3<0, RN6=0 are added to RN6>0. 
                                                              For other details, see Table 2. 
 
 
Graph 1 shows that the share of firms with coordinate (RN6>0; RF3<0) is greater than that reported 
into  the  (RN6<0;  RF3>0)  sub-space,  respectively  17%  and  11%.  Focusing  the  attention to  the 
RF3>0  situations,  it  results  that eleven  out  of  seventy-one  firms  (15.5%)  do  not  pay  taxes.  In 
contrast, seventeen out of thirty (55%) “RF3<0 firms” present positive taxable incomes.   
 
 
   9 
Another interesting picture can be drawn by table 4, which gives a quantitative impression of the 
firm distribution according to their “income status”.    
 
 
Table 4. Firms Distribution (1
st column) and Income Values (¼) 
$%62/87(
5)  51 5) 51 51
!  £     
    >0     >0      38,541,132,876       63,559,490,210       63,784,313,965  
    <0     <0       
  ³     
       
3(5&$3,7$
5)  51 5) 51 51
!  £                              
    >0     >0                130,609                 215,392                 216,154  
    <0     <0       
  ³     
       
5(/$7,9(
5)  51 5)51 5)51 5151
!  £                           
    >0     >0                       0.6   0.6  1.0 
    <0     <0       
  ³     
I do not report negative values. For other details see table 2. 
 
 
The first row, collecting income values for firms with positive post-tax income (RF3) and non 
positive  taxable  income  (RN6),  shows  that  these  firms  have  larger  negative  than  positive 
adjustments (see section 3) such that their RF3/RN1 ratio is 2.7. The remaining 2.3 billions euro 
disappear throughout the second income “race” from RN1 to RN6. In contrast, for the “normal” 
firms  of  the  second  row  characterized  by  positive  incomes,  the  adjustments almost  double  the 
income for tax purposes (RF3/RN1 is equal to 0.6), while things are not changed by the second race 
(RN1/RN6 is equal to one). The last row indicates the emergence of positive taxable incomes even 
for firms with negative post-tax income. As expected, the per capita values for these latter situations 
are much smaller than those for normal firms.       
 
As already mentioned, the main difference between RF3 and RN1 is due to positive and negative 
adjustments. What is behind that? By and large, the former deal with not tax-deductible items and 
with revenues not/under reported in financial accounting, the latter with tax-exempt items and with 










   10 
Table 5. Positive (A, B) and negative (C, D) adjustments. Values (¼) and composition (%). Fiscal year 2000. 
$ %  & '
    
                   494.429.490   1%                    204.732.821   0% 
                   192.903.561   0%                    155.189.106   0% 
                2.331.370.295   3%    
                1.714.888.925   2%                    387.372.142   1% 
                   133.240.790   0%                      18.900.409   0% 
                   259.299.662   0%                        4.745.235   0% 
                   122.783.684   0%    
                     92.735.983   0%    
                   397.267.246   1%                    420.233.287   1% 
                   106.937.590   0%                    969.041.406   2% 
                 1.731.559.157   3% 
                     69.644.006   0%    
                     16.145.213   0%    
                   170.998.907   0%                 59.719.720,43   0% 
                1.037.928.939   1%      
                2.054.961.055   3%      
                   155.416.114   0%      
                   958.385.419   1%      
                   884.396.500   1%      
                   286.454.555   0%      
                1.462.067.581   2%      
                     34.450.661   0%      
      
                   597.479.126   1%      
                   217.602.032   0%      
      
      
  100%  727$/  100% 





￿ , the last row displays the figures corresponding to those identified by the RF32 and the RF47 fiscal codes in table 3.  
  
 
Table 5 show that the most important positive adjustments (columns A, B) are due to unpaid taxes 
(line  12),  not  tax  deductible  depreciation  and  amortization  (line  24),  and  “other”  positive 
adjustments  (line  27),  with  shares  of,  respectively,  54%,  11%,  10%.  The  largest  negative 
adjustments  (columns C, D) are due to “other” negative adjustments, not-taxable income, and 
revenues coming from firm real estate “extra” businesses, with shares of, respectively, 44%, 20%, 
8%. It is interesting to notice that among positive and negative adjustments the fiscal authority 
ask  corporation  to  include,  respectively,  revenues  and  costs  not/under  reported  in  financial 
accounting. The relative impact of the former (columns A, B, lines 7,8,9) is zero for a total of 
474,000 euros, while the latter amount to a huge 44% (22 billions euro; columns C, D, line 14). 
Needless to say, this result is not necessarily associated with misleading/fraudulent behaviour 
on the part of firms, but some suspicion remains (see the next section). Moreover it may help to 
explain  why  fiscal  authorities  are  demanding  for  more  and  more  details  about  the  financial 
statement of the firms.    




Looking for other stylised facts, I replicate at a more disaggregated level some of the experiments 
made in the previous section. In fact, fiscal policies are usually aimed to support some particular 
sector  and/or  region.  Also,  it  is  well  known  that  firms  face  heterogeneous  tax  environments 
according to their size. These differences across industries/regions/sizes are possible explanations 
for  why  the  reported  tax  liabilities  of  firms  are  differentiate.  The  following  tables  exhibit  the 
situation for Italian corporations in 2000 as emerge from the Diecofis database. 
 
 
Table 6. Firms distribution according to the book-tax incomes.  
 
  6a.   Macro Regions     
5)  51 1: 1( & 6,    
!  £         
    >0     >0  65%  58%  61%  52%     
    <0     <0  10%  11%  16%  15%     
  ³         
NW=Piedmont, Liguria, Valle d’Aosta, Lombardy.  NE=Friuli V. G., Trentino A. A., Veneto, Emilia-Romagna. 
C=Abruzzo, Molise, Marches, Tuscany, Umbria, Latium.  S=Sardinia, Sicily, Apulia, Basilicata, Calabria, Campania.      
             
  6b.   Size in terms of employment   
5)  51     !  
!  £        
    >0     >0  59%  58%  66%  62%  59%   
    <0     <0  14%  10%  9%  12%  14%   
  ³        
             
             
                                6c.   Industries 
5)  51 0,1,1* 0$18) (/(&75 &21675 75$'( +27(/
!  £       
    >0     >0  52%  63%  39%  53%  68%  64% 
    <0     <0  27%  13%  11%  12%  9%  17% 
  ³       
             
5)  51 75$163 5($/(67 ('8& +($/7+ 27+(56(59 
!  £        
    >0     >0  41%  58%  52%  68%  47%   
    <0     <0  28%  12%  21%  2%  22%   
  ³        
See Table 2 and Graph 1 
 
 
Due to several fiscal policies implemented, southern corporations face a more favourable taxation 
than the others. Thus, as expected, they show an almost triple share of firms with no taxable income 
(RN6£0),  twenty-one  out  of  seventy-three  (35%  vs  13%),  despite  their  quota  of  profitable 
companies (LH with RF3>0) is comparable to the rest of the country (73% vs 70%). Among north-
eastern non-lucrative firms, those with positive taxable income are the double than the others (21% 
vs 11%).  
   12 
Figures referring to the different sizes point out that a quarter of profitable firms with more than 250 
employees  do  not  pay  taxes  despite  their  post-tax  income  is  greater  than  zero.  The  picture  is 
different for middle-sized firms (20-99), for which the percentage falls to 16.6%. Corporations with 
10-19 workers manifest the greatest share of uneconomic firms with positive RN6 (68.7%). Above 
the one-hundred-employees threshold, firms display similar conditions.  
 
As for industries, income races outcomes are quite different. More than eight out of ten unprofitable 
firms operating in the electrical energy, gas, steam and water and health and social work services 
sectors report positive taxable income. The quota for mining, and hotels and restaurants is one-third. 
Considering only lucrative corporations, the income races lead to less volatile results. All industries 
display share of RN6£0between 71% (construction) and 95% (electrical energy, gas, steam and 
water).     
 
The  disaggregated  level  of  the  analysis  allows  performing  another  intriguing  experiment.  The 
empirical literature in tax evasion investigates firm characteristics which predict the probability or 
the extent of the firm’s evasion. However, no empirical papers explore book-tax differences as a 
possible signal of avoidance activity. Here I try to fill the gap exploiting the data disaggregated for 
industries because the Italian national institute of statistics releases data for non-observed labour 
input even at the industry level. The attempt is easily explained. I compare the sectoral irregularity 
ratios (LH the share of irregular workers on total) with the above mentioned percentage of firms 
reporting a non positive taxable income (RN6£0 in terms of the previous tables and graphs). A 
possible signal that managers are fussing over their tax liabilities is a high, significant, and positive 
correlation between these two ratios. Otherwise stated, the more the tax evasion is widespread in an 
industry, the higher should be the share of its firms reporting no taxable income. Actually, the data 
for the eleven industries described in Graph 2c show that the above mentioned correlation is high, 
positive (53%) and statistically significant (at the 99% level). Similar results are obtained with the 
non parametric Spearman rank correlation coefficient. Table 7 and graph 2 give a visual idea of the 
association. 
       
 
 
Table 7. Taxable and Shadow Incomes in Italian Industries (2000)  
ELECTRICAL 
ENERGY GAS STEAM 
AND WATER   MANUFACTURING  
 EDUCATION 
SERVICES  
 HEALTH AND SOCIAL 
WORK SERVICES  
 PRODUCTS FROM 
MINING  
 WHOLESALE AND 
RETAIL TRADE 
SERVICES  
0.9%  5.8%  6.0%  7.2%  9.1%  9.1% 
13.1%  21.2%  34.0%  18.2%  35.1%  18.3% 
           
 
   REAL ESTATE 
RENTING AND 
BUSINESS SERVICES    CONSTRUCTION  




 TRANSPORT STORAGE 
AND COMMUNICATION 
SERVICES  
 HOTEL AND 
RESTAURANT 
SERVICES    
15.2%  15.5%  17.4%  29.0%  32.0%   
19.1%  33.8%  38.5%  40.1%  27.4%   
Data are ordered according to the irregularity ratio (first row) starting from the lowest. In the second row is reported 
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This  paper  presents  an  empirical  investigation  of  the  gap  between  financial 
accounting  income  and  taxable  income  of  Italian  corporations.  In  the  international 
literature there is little debate that these incomes are diverging, while what is causing 
the divergence and whether and how to fix it are very much open questions. In Italy, 
due to lack of data, the research languishes and even the basic quantification of the 
gap is still unknown. Possibly because of that, it seems that the existence of the differences 
between reported profits and taxable income causes little political costs. We may only note an 
increasing  “curiosity”  of  fiscal  authorities  about  companies’  balance  sheets.  In  contrast,  for 
instance, in the US the main reason why the alternative minimum tax system was introduced in the 
first place was that the criticisms by Congress and journalists that those firms which distributed 
profits as dividends without paying tax were accepted.    
 
Against this background the present work is one of the first attempt to point out some 
stylised facts about the book-tax income gap of Italian corporations. This goal has been 
obtained by taking advantage of the Diecofis database. Although it is limited to the 
fiscal year 2000, it is very analytical (item-by-item), fully representative of the universe, and 
under continuous updating.  
 
Results suggest that, as expected (why pay more?), in Italy there is an active industry set up to 
enable taxpayers to identify and utilize particular tax effects. A less expected outcome shows that 
the “income race” more often finishes in a quite different way, with unprofitable companies ending 
up with positive taxable incomes. A disaggregated analysis highlights that this latter situation is 
much  less  common  among  southern  corporations  and  large  enterprises,  especially  in  the 
construction and in the hotel/restaurant services sectors, than elsewhere. Finally, data suggest that 
industries  whose  firms  more  frequently  declare  negative  taxable  incomes  tend  to  display 
significantly higher shares of irregular workers, as well. A question naturally arise – is this picture 
what really lawmakers, and even managers, want? 
 
To conclude, one word on what already done and one word on what could be done. Some of the 
reasons why remunerative firms may not report tax liabilities or YLFHYHUVD depend on the dynamic 
nature  of  the  budgeting  activity  (HJ  losses  carried  forward  from  preceding  tax  years)  and  on 
overlapping fiscal policies. It means that the empirical evidence here reported should be thought of 
as the first step toward a dynamic analysis. This latter is paramount, especially for its potentially 
strong normative content. That is why it is in the agenda. 
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